

THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
A STUDY IN HUMAN RELATIONS

By

James L. Jordan
Commander
United States Navy

The George Washington University

May 1953

P R E F A C E

During the past decade, our government has embarked upon a series of great social programs designed to strengthen the free world against the rampant forces of intolerance and aggression. Chief among these are: The European Recovery Program, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and Point Four. There are people at home and abroad who argue that these programs stem from motives of pecuniary gain and self preservation. True, there may be an element of enlightened self-interest in each of them, but equally evident to the unbiased observer is the presence of a mutuality of interests. The very title of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program connotes the philosophy of mutual interest in preserving the status quo.

I like to think of these programs as experiments in human relations on an international scale. Certainly, it would be no exaggeration to say that the Mutual Defense Program created human relations problems of substantial magnitude both within our own governmental agencies and in our relations with the recipient

During the past decade, our Government has achieved a
series of great social programs designed to strengthen the
world against the impact of international terrorism.
Chief among these are: The National Recovery Program, the
National Education Program, and the War. These are being
now and should soon have been completed with the
of recovery and self preservation. Now, we are in
a position of self-defense in order to keep our
economy to the highest standard in the world and to
insure. The very life of the whole nation is
now depends the following of which follows in
order.

I like to think of these programs as being
related to an international scale. Therefore, it is to be
remembered to say that the whole nation is now
related to the international situation and to the
Governmental structure and in our relations with the world.

nations. I was closely associated with this program as a member of the Military Assistance Mission to Belgium during a three year period, and presume, therefore, to speak with some authority on the human relations aspects connected therewith. Some of the statements made with regard to relationships between the military departments may appear somewhat biased, not to say indiscreet. In this regard, I wish to emphasize that any discussion of human relations problems inevitably leads to the disclosure of unpleasant details; otherwise, there would be no problems. In any event, the opinions herein expressed are wholly mine and for which I take full responsibility.

The introduction delves briefly into the background of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. Part I deals with problems in human relations between Americans involved in the program, while Part II takes up similar problems arising between Americans and Europeans which were attributable to the program.

...the relation between the two shells and the other ... details of the ... there would be no problem. In my view, ... latest problem in the ... of the ... I wish to emphasize that my discussion of these and of the ... I am closely associated with this ... as I ...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION.	1
The North Atlantic Treaty	
The Mutual Defense Assistance Program	
PART I.	9
The Impact of the Program on American Special Interest Groups	
PART II.	22
The Foreign Relations Problem	
CONCLUSION.	35
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	38

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	Introduction
2	The Social and Political Situation
3	The Social and Political Situation
4	The Social and Political Situation
5	The Social and Political Situation
6	The Social and Political Situation
7	The Social and Political Situation
8	The Social and Political Situation
9	The Social and Political Situation
10	The Social and Political Situation
11	The Social and Political Situation
12	The Social and Political Situation
13	The Social and Political Situation
14	The Social and Political Situation
15	The Social and Political Situation
16	The Social and Political Situation
17	The Social and Political Situation
18	The Social and Political Situation
19	The Social and Political Situation
20	The Social and Political Situation
21	The Social and Political Situation
22	The Social and Political Situation
23	The Social and Political Situation
24	The Social and Political Situation
25	The Social and Political Situation
26	The Social and Political Situation
27	The Social and Political Situation
28	The Social and Political Situation
29	The Social and Political Situation
30	The Social and Political Situation
31	The Social and Political Situation
32	The Social and Political Situation
33	The Social and Political Situation
34	The Social and Political Situation
35	The Social and Political Situation
36	The Social and Political Situation
37	The Social and Political Situation
38	The Social and Political Situation
39	The Social and Political Situation
40	The Social and Political Situation
41	The Social and Political Situation
42	The Social and Political Situation
43	The Social and Political Situation
44	The Social and Political Situation
45	The Social and Political Situation
46	The Social and Political Situation
47	The Social and Political Situation
48	The Social and Political Situation
49	The Social and Political Situation
50	The Social and Political Situation

INTRODUCTION

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY
1215 EAST 58TH STREET
CHICAGO, ILL. 60637
TEL. 773-936-5000

1. The first part of the paper discusses the
general theory of the subject.
2. The second part discusses the
application of the theory to the
case of the subject.
3. The third part discusses the
results of the experiments.
4. The fourth part discusses the
conclusions of the experiments.
5. The fifth part discusses the
implications of the results.

On April 4, 1949, twelve nations¹ comprising the North Atlantic Alliance Signed the North Atlantic Treaty. The preamble of the treaty stated its purpose as follows:

The parties to this treaty re-affirm their faith in the purpose and principles of the United Nations.....they are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.²

The keynote of the treaty is contained in Article 5 which states:³

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.....each of them will assist the parties so attacked by such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

¹ United States, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, Iceland, Portugal, Italy, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway and Denmark.

² The President's message to Congress dated April 12, 1949, which transmitted the North Atlantic Treaty to the Senate for approval, page 10.

³ Ibid, 11.

The North Atlantic Treaty was the instrument by which the free world expressed its determination to resist the intolerable threat of aggression posed by the Soviet Union. The signatory nations agreed to join together in assisting any member who became a victim of armed attack. These were inspiring words, but as several of the member nations pointed out, quite meaningless in the light of their existing economic and military potentialities. Their appeals for aid from the United States aroused a great debate in the Congress which culminated in passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas, Congresswoman from California, was an articulate defender of the aid bill. She stated the case for the bill before a committee of the whole House as follows:⁴

Our preventative action, as I have already said is the North Atlantic Treaty. We have joined with the other signatories in building, through self help and mutual aid a common defense for the common good. Now our partners in Western Europe have turned to us for help. Their appeals rise out of the same conditions that lead to the proposal for the North Atlantic Treaty.

On October 6, 1949, the Congress appropriated slightly over one billion dollars to be used in assisting the nine signa-

⁴ From the Congressional Record - House, of August 17, 1949. Page 5993, 81st Congress, First Session, July-August 1949.

tory powers who had requested military aid. The enabling legislation known as the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 had as its stated purpose:⁵

To promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing military assistance to foreign nations.

There was a great hue and cry set up by certain members of Congress that strings should be attached to the expenditure of these funds, but others felt that better relations would obtain if we placed our trust in our European partners. As it eventuated, very few restrictive provisions were included in the law, but the desired restraints were secured in the bilateral treaties which were later negotiated with the recipient countries.

The most important and controversial provisions of the bilateral agreements were the following:

- (a) Security. To safeguard United States classified material in the manner prescribed for its security under United States Law.
- (b) Military Assistance Group. To receive an agreed upon number of United States military personnel for an indefinite period of time,

⁵ Public Law 329, 81st Congress, Approved October 6, 1949.

and to make available to them such facilities as necessary for observation and assistance of the military forces of the country.

- (c) Financial Support. To provide local currency to defray all administrative costs of the United States Military Assistance Groups.
- (d) Military Requirements. To raise and maintain the requisite number of military units to absorb and efficiently utilize the military equipment furnished by the United States under the Military Aid Program.
- (e) Mutual Assistance. To render such military aid to other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as practicable within the limits of the country's resources.

As will be shown later, serious problems in human relations grew out of the provisions of the bilateral treaties. Never before in modern world history had sovereign nations relaxed the barriers of nationalism to the extent made necessary by the Mutual Defense Program. Conversely, never before in modern history had these nations been in such deadly peril. Limited loss of sovereignty was the price of survival.

and it was available to them from the United States Navy. The Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft in the Pacific and the Navy had a large number of ships and aircraft in the Pacific.

(c) United States Navy. To provide for the

to have all necessary ships and aircraft

United States Navy, United States Navy

(d) United States Navy. To provide for the

to provide for the United States Navy

and to provide for the United States Navy

and to provide for the United States Navy

the United States Navy

(e) United States Navy. To provide for the

to provide for the United States Navy

to provide for the United States Navy

to provide for the United States Navy

to provide for the United States Navy

to provide for the United States Navy

to provide for the United States Navy

to provide for the United States Navy

to provide for the United States Navy

to provide for the United States Navy

to provide for the United States Navy

Public Law 329, the provisions of the bilateral treaties, and implementing instructions of the State and Defense Departments provided the Military Assistance Advisory Groups in each country with their objectives. Briefly, they were the following:

- (a) To requisition, receive and transfer title of military equipment within the approved material programs of the recipient country.
- (b) To assist the country in drawing up material programs for ensuing years.
- (c) To screen country programs against criteria established by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and regional planning groups.
- (d) To furnish such training assistance as requested by the recipient country, and as considered appropriate to implement the material program.
- (e) To observe and report on the efficiency of end-use of United States equipment by the armed forces of the recipient country.

Here again were sown the seeds of controversy. According to their terms of reference, the American military representatives were required to inspect and report on the use of equipment within

the country; also, they were to insure the safety of classified material in the hands of foreign nationals. Legally speaking, the requisite authority to do this was contained in the bilateral agreements, but what if the country authorities simply refused to open up for inspection? What recourse did the United States representatives have? The recourse was to recommend to the President that military aid to the country be discontinued. Suppose this type of action took place on a grand scale, what then became of the Mutual Defense Program? The entire program might fail even though both parties were in the right. A sovereign nation has a totality of rights within its boundaries; by the same token, United States representatives would be acting in accordance with the bilateral treaties. No, it was not a question of who was right or who had the authority, it was basically a matter of establishing good human relations through which objectives could be achieved by mutual good will and cooperation.

The Military Assistance Groups were composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, usually stationed, for purposes of convenience, in the capitol city of the country involved. In some countries the commanding officer of the combined group was an Army General, in others a Navy Admiral, or Air Force General. The human relations difficulties which arose in these combined groups resulted from deeply rooted inter-service conflicts rather than personal

antipathies. The harmony and friendly atmosphere of the social life was in marked contrast to the spirit of rivalry that existed in the formal organization.

PART I

THE IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM ON
AMERICAN SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program created new problems in human relations between executive agencies of the government as well as within the agencies themselves. Control of the program carried with it increased powers for the controlling agency.

It is but a step from the desire for possession to the desire for power. Just as in primitive society the man with a weapon or tool was stronger than he whose strength consisted solely of his wits and bare hands, so in modern civilization the individual with extensive possessions is more powerful than the one who has few or none. That is to say, the former can do more things.¹

So it is with people acting in groups. The one billion dollars already appropriated for the first year's program, plus the additional billions likely to be voted in future years, dangled like the proverbial sugar plum before the eyes of State, Defense, and ECA. Agencies not wishing to be trampled in the rush moved quickly out of the way. ECA realized that its days were numbered, since the Economic Cooperation Program had long since passed its zenith. The State Department was still rankled over the fact that ECA had wangled independent missions abroad. The Defense Department, above all, had a special axe to grind. The Mutual

¹ Elmore Peterson and E. Grosvenor Plowman, Business Organization and Management, (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1949, revised edition) 392.

Defense Assistance Program would provide an untold number of desirable European billets for the Army, Navy, and Air Force who were hard pressed at the time to provide jobs for their officers and enlisted personnel at home. Moreover, administrative control of these additional billions opened up whole new vistas of spending power and personnel expansion. Is it any wonder that human relations problems became the first concern of the administration in effectuating the program?

The President wisely placed control of the overall program in the hands of one department--State. This was done over the loud protests of the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, who felt that State did not have the necessary qualifications to manage a defense program. The decision was a good one, however, because it placed all American representatives in each foreign country under the control of the traditional Chief of Mission--the Ambassador. The ECA had very little to say on the subject and appeared to be more than a little grateful for this new lease on life. The wrangling between agencies ceased as a result of the President's decision, but the turmoil within the Department of Defense was only beginning.

Unification of the three armed services was accomplished, ostensibly, by the National Security Act of 1947, which, "..... provides for their authoritative coordination and unified direction

and covered at the time of providing jobs for their children and for
 always European citizens for the year 1947, and in 1948 and 1949
 before and before 1947 would be the same as before 1947.

These various factors have led to the development of a new type of machine, the "Automatic" type, which is now being used in many of the larger plants. This type of machine is designed to handle a wide range of materials, and is capable of producing a high quality product at a low cost. It is also capable of handling a large volume of material, and is therefore well suited for use in large-scale production.

[illegible]

...to the National Security Act of 1947, which...

under civilian control, but not to merge them....."2

It is heresy for a member of the armed services to suggest that the battle for supremacy still rages within the Department of Defense, but newspaper columnists are under no such inhibitions. Five years after passage of the National Security Act the well known columnists, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, referring to a picture which appeared in Life Magazine, had this to say:³

The photograph showed an Air Force General proudly planting a flag on an island of floating ice in the Arctic. The flag was not the American flag. It was the flag of the United States Air Force. The flag planting ceremony represented no victory over an enemy of this country. It represented a victory over the United States Navy, which had been racing the Air Force to reach the ice island first. This disease is the blind and bitter rivalry between the services.

So much for the peace that reigns in the Department of Defense.

As to who should administer the lion's share of the program, the Navy and Air Force reluctantly agreed that the Army was the logical choice, since the bulk of the aid was aimed at the creation of ground forces in Europe. In the words of General Omar Bradley, "European manpower will form the hard core of our combined defense effort." Neither did the other two services ob-

² Public Law 253, 80th Congress, Approved 26 July 1947.

³ Joseph and Stewart Alsop in the Washington Post, January 28, 1953.

ject when the Department of the Army was designated as the "Executive Agent" of the Defense Department, to coordinate the efforts of the three services. The suspicion was not long in arising, however, that the Army had something in mind beyond mere coordination; the idea of an "Army Operation" was rapidly taking hold. The Navy and Air Force having conceded the role of Executive Agent to the Army, had no intention of sublimating their identities or their prerogatives in a so-called Army Operation. The problem was resolved in the following manner. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after some debate, finally compromised the situation by issuing a paper which limited the power of the Army to matters of overall military interest, reserving a measure of independence for the other two services in administering their own personnel, material, and technical matters. Although this solved the surface problem, particularly in the Pentagon, it did not blunt the suspicions of the personnel assigned to duty abroad. They felt, and with some justification, as events later proved, that the Army would attempt to assume complete control once the groups were isolated in remote foreign communities.

The first contingent of the American Military Mission to Belgium, consisting of one Army Colonel, one Army Lieutenant Colonel, and one Navy Commander, entered Brussels on January 1, 1950. Their

mission, as the advance group, was to set up the offices and administrative arrangements for the succeeding echelons to come. It is interesting to note that only one officer of the advance group belonged to a service other than the Army. There would, in fact, have been three officers from the Army except for the emphatic insistence of the senior Naval Officer that the Navy be represented in the advance group. Unfortunately the Chief of the Air Force section was too junior to demand that he be similarly represented. The first step taken was to distribute office space in the building assigned by the American Embassy to the three services. This was quietly attended to by the two Army officers who quite naturally assigned all of the desirable spaces to the Army section. The Naval officer, when he became aware of this situation, was confronted by a fait accompli. When he insisted on a more equitable distribution of space for the Naval and Air Force sections he came face to face with the realities of military life--Colonels are senior to Commanders especially when there are two Colonels to one Commander. This clash of interests seems comparatively trivial, but the important thing involved was working space rather than prestige.

Of primary importance is the environment within which an employee or executive performs his duties. It includes conditions of health, comfort, decency and convenience.⁴

⁴ Elmore Peterson and E. Crosvenor Plowman, Business Organization and Management, (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1949, revised edition) 309.

The first step on the ladder of poor human relations between the three services had been taken.

Loyalty between seniors and juniors in any kind of enterprise is a factor of prime importance in establishing good human relations. As Peterson and Plowman put it:⁵

"Morale" denotes confidence and loyalty to superiors. Obviously a subordinate cannot be loyal to a superior in office when he feels uncertain about the latter's authority. Conversely, an executive finds himself in a difficult if not inimical position when he seeks to stimulate confidence and develop loyalty in persons when he is not sure they are responsible to him.

The question of confidence and loyalty arose to plague the Naval representative of the advance group prior to the arrival of his commanding officer in Brussels. The Army Commanding General of the combined group suggested in confidence to this Naval officer that he might become Chief of the Naval Section if he agreed to submit certain recommendations to his parent service in Washington. The recommendation the General desired him to submit was the following: "A preliminary survey of the local situation indicates that there is no need for calling forward a senior Navy Captain as Chief of the Naval Section." The recipient of this proposal found

⁵ Ibid, 71.

The first step in the history of post-war relations between the

United States and Japan.

History between Japan and the United States is not new.

There is a history of close relations in Asia.

Relations in Asia and the Pacific.

History of Japan's relations with the United States. Japan's relations with the United States have been a subject of interest to the United States since the first contact between the two nations in 1597. Japan's relations with the United States have been a subject of interest to the United States since the first contact between the two nations in 1597.

The history of Japan's relations with the United States is not new.

History of Japan's relations with the United States.

History of Japan's relations with the United States.

History of Japan's relations with the United States.

History of Japan's relations with the United States.

History of Japan's relations with the United States.

History of Japan's relations with the United States.

History of Japan's relations with the United States.

History of Japan's relations with the United States.

History of Japan's relations with the United States.

himself in a most awkward position. The implications of the proposition were clear. The General desired a junior officer who would be more amenable to his suggestions than a senior Naval Captain. To which superior did this junior officer owe his loyalty? He was responsible to both. At the cost of establishing poor human relations with his Commanding General, the Naval officer declined to submit the requested recommendation, and reported the incident to his senior officer upon his arrival at the post.

Esprit de corps has been long recognized as a synonym for morale or pride in service. This esprit de corps is an emotional factor which strongly colors the attitude of personnel of the three services. It is dangerous from a human relations point of view to ignore it. Peterson and Plowman say that:⁶

Situations involving emotions and attitudes constantly arise between groups of workers. To ignore them, resist them, or to fail even to recognize them will lead to mistakes and sometimes to disaster.

Administration of the joint military headquarters in Brussels had been taken over by Army personnel. Orders and instructions were issued by the administrative section in the Army

⁶ Ibid, 47.

himself in a most unbecoming manner. The intention of the
 position was clear. The General desired a further officer who
 would be more amenable to his instructions than a civilian would.

Again, to show respect to this further officer, the
 loyalty of the responsible to both, is the basis of relations.
 The poor man's relations with the General, however, the General
 always desired to put in the General's presence, and to
 ensure the loyalty of his further officer, who was acting in the
 General's name.

It is to be noted that the General was a person for
 whose loyalty was in question. This was the case in an ordinary
 case, with the General's own hands of persons at his
 disposal. It is impossible from a human relation point of
 view to ignore the General's own hands.

It is to be noted that the General was a person for
 whose loyalty was in question. This was the case in an ordinary
 case, with the General's own hands of persons at his
 disposal. It is impossible from a human relation point of
 view to ignore the General's own hands.

It is to be noted that the General was a person for
 whose loyalty was in question. This was the case in an ordinary
 case, with the General's own hands of persons at his
 disposal. It is impossible from a human relation point of
 view to ignore the General's own hands.

format and Army language. Customs and traditions of the other two services in matters of protocol, phraseology, and references to regulations were completely ignored. If the situation had not contained certain elements of humor it would have had a devastating effect upon morale. For example: there were instructions to the Naval section to give its estimate of "Division Slice" for ships and fleets, reference was made to Naval "troop organizations and tables of equipment," or requests for compliance with Army Regulation so and so. The crowning blow was delivered by certain well meaning, but ignorant, Army sergeants of the administrative office who addressed senior Naval officers as "Colonel," and Navy Chief Petty Officers as "sergeant." The end effect of this insensitivity toward pride of service was to strengthen the unity within service groups and emphasize the lack of unity of the whole. As evidence of the desire to retain its identity the Naval section meticulously referred to floors as decks, stairways as ladders, walls as bulkheads, pillars as stanchions, coffee as jamoke, and the drinking fountain as the scuttlebut.

On the subject of cooperation, Newman said:⁷

A person is more likely to understand and support an action he has helped plan. Whatever

⁷ William H. Newman, Administrative Action, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951) 457.

financial and legal language. Overhead and consultation of the latter for
 evidence in support of proposed, financially, and otherwise, as
 regulations were completely ignored. In the situation and was
 involved certain elements of which it would have been a very serious
 effect upon results. For example, there were limitations to the
 actual working to give the evidence of "division of labor" the right
 and those, evidence was also in that "strong" organizations and
 rather of efficiency, or otherwise, for evidence was given to be
 also as and so. The intended flow was delivered by certain well
 meaning, but ignorant, very competent at the administrative office
 was addressed major issues as "critical," and they failed
 forty officers at the same time. The end result of this investigation
 present state of affairs was so complicated and very serious matter
 errors and expenses the lack of ability of the staff, in evidence
 at the desire to reveal the identity the staff members and to
 referred to those as being, although in fact, some of the
 board, which as mentioned, called in London, and the situation
 themselves as the result.

the explanation, this desire for participation is prevalent and becomes increasingly strong among competent and self-reliant people.

Perhaps the answer to the foregoing problem is contained in these words. Good will and cooperation might well have replaced resentment in carrying out orders if the Army had recognized the situation as one requiring consultation with its sister services.

In government service, whether it be civilian in nature or military, status or relative rank is measured by: the number of people controlled, the amount of money administered, and corollary to these two, loudness of voice in council. Robert Dubin, writing on human relations in administration, stated that:⁸

Status is always evident in a system of rankings.....there is no such thing as solitary status. There always have to be two individuals or groups to compare. Furthermore, the comparison has to result in the conclusion that one is "better," "higher," "more important," than the other.

The inter-service "pecking order" in Brussels was established as follows: (1) Army, (2) Navy, and (3) Air Force. This order was based principally on the dollar values of their respective programs. Now, at the risk of incurring the wrath of the

⁸ Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951) 254.

powers that be, the writer makes the daring observation that the Air Force was never one to remain long in the position of low chicken in the pecking order. It would be even more daring to describe the series of maneuvers by which the Air Force section moved itself into second place in the local hierarchy of services. Suffice it to say that this was done in the interest of status, but at the cost of good human relations.

Perhaps the trivial incidents which have been used to illustrate the human relations problems of the Military Assistance Group have tended to over-emphasize the magnitude of that problem. Actually the situation was no more serious than the day to day frictions arising in any enterprise involving human actions and reactions. The fact that these problems were recognized and overcome speaks well for the officials charged with supervision of the program. "Solving and remedying a grievance is one of the greatest challenges any supervisor meets."⁹ Sounding boards for airing grievances were established by order of the Commanding General in the form of committees. Among these committees were:

- (a) Enlisted men's committee, composed of en-

⁹ Willard E. Parker and Robert W. Kliemeier, Human Relations in Supervision, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951) 332.

power that for the whole of the 19th century the
the force was never one to be reckoned with in the
condition in the working order. It would be very
desirable for the sake of convenience of which the
would itself have second place in the list of
last. But it is not that the first in the list of
views, but in the case of new power.

listed representatives of the three services. Its purpose was to bring before the Commanding General any matter having to do with welfare, recreation, or family problems.

- (b) An executive committee composed of the executive officers of the three services. This committee dealt with any matters of inter-service interest, human relations, and operational problems of joint interest.
- (c) Civilian grievance committee. This committee had as members, both civilian and officer representatives of the three services. It heard and attempted to reconcile any type of grievance brought before it by civilian employees. Difficult cases were referred to the Commanding General.

In addition to the above committees, the Commanding General declared himself available on a twenty-four hour basis to hear complaints by any member of the organization. Obviously it was not possible to remove the fundamental causes for inter-service

linked representations of the same subject.
The picture was in fact before the Commission
the general and rather broad in its scope.
There, the matter is fairly finished.

(b) as mentioned committee members of the Commission

the officials of the same committee. This
committee shall also be subject of information
received directly, from various, and some
final program of joint interest.

(c) Division Program Committee. This committee

has as subject, the division and other
related issues of the same subject. It shall
not attempt to coordinate any type of action
and in some cases it is possible to coordinate.
Difficult cases were referred to the Commission.

for Council.

In addition to the above committee, the Commission shall also
other similar committee on a subject that may be in some way
related to the subject of the organization. Obviously it may not
possible to remove the Commission's power for information

rivalry—this will come only with years of unification—but much of the surface friction was removed by the application of the principles of good human relations.

revelations will come from the study of the
of the various theories and theories of the
principles of good human relations.

PART II

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS PROBLEM

Thinking Americans at home are becoming increasingly concerned about the criticism voiced abroad of our countrymen, for high living, "boondogling," arrogance, and ingrained "gookism." In one of her columns, Malvina Lindsay stated:¹

Some of those experienced in recruitment of foreign employees believe there are certain attitudes that should especially be taboo in selecting foreign service personnel. One is the feeling that a great sacrifice is being made to work overseas and that foreign people should be grateful to Uncle Sam for sending the worker to them. Another is a naive sense of superiority to foreign ways. This is manifest also in refusal to bother learning the foreign language. Still another is the missionary zeal to "make people over in our own image." One of the chief criticisms of Americans working abroad is that their standards of living are too high.

These attitudes contributed, among other things, to poor human relations between the American Military Group and the Belgians. There were wide divergences, not only in our respective ways of life, but in our military traditions, technical aptitudes, and methods of doing business.

Officially speaking, the way had been cleared for placing the program in effect in Belgium. The objectives and scope of the

¹ Malvina Lindsay, High Livers Abroad, A Long Range Issue, The Washington Post, newspaper, January 28, 1953, Page 12.

Thinking, however, as to how we should best proceed, we
 cannot avoid the conclusion which seems to me inevitable, that
 this living, "historical," "evolutionary," and "integral" science,
 is one of our highest, noblest, and most important.

Some of these questions in connection
 of the living sciences which have been certain
 questions that should especially be taken in
 connection with the living sciences. One is the
 question of the living sciences in connection with
 the living sciences. One is the question of the
 living sciences in connection with the living sciences.
 One is the question of the living sciences in connection
 with the living sciences. One is the question of the
 living sciences in connection with the living sciences.
 One is the question of the living sciences in connection
 with the living sciences. One is the question of the
 living sciences in connection with the living sciences.
 One is the question of the living sciences in connection
 with the living sciences. One is the question of the
 living sciences in connection with the living sciences.

These questions, however, which have been certain
 questions that should especially be taken in
 connection with the living sciences. One is the
 question of the living sciences in connection with
 the living sciences. One is the question of the
 living sciences in connection with the living sciences.
 One is the question of the living sciences in connection
 with the living sciences. One is the question of the
 living sciences in connection with the living sciences.
 One is the question of the living sciences in connection
 with the living sciences. One is the question of the
 living sciences in connection with the living sciences.
 One is the question of the living sciences in connection
 with the living sciences. One is the question of the
 living sciences in connection with the living sciences.

program were clear to both sides, the Military Assistance Group knew its mission and the bilateral treaty ostensibly removed any obstacles to extraterritorial operations. The only factor which had not been taken into account was human relations. As it turned out, this factor was the single one upon which the success or failure of the entire program depended. If a graph could be drawn, it would show that the progress of the program varied in direct proportion to the progress of good human relations. Specifically, what were the obstacles to good human relations? In the writer's opinion, they might be listed in the following order of importance:

- (a) European suspicion of the philosophy behind the Military Aid Program.
- (b) Differential in the relative standards of living.
- (c) Mutual lack of understanding of the other's way of life, habits, and culture.
- (d) American worship of efficiency and technocracy versus European preoccupation with tradition.
- (e) European jealousy of American prosperity, world leadership, and "bigness."

Many well informed Americans have written off the accusation that our aid programs are inspired by self-interest, as con-

persons were shown to have been, the military authorities were
 given the names and the military records of persons who
 belonged to revolutionary organizations. The only names which
 had not been taken into account were those of persons, as it seemed
 not, this factor was the state one upon which the success or failure
 was of the military process depended. It is worth noting in this
 connection that the progress of the military action is closely con-
 nected to the progress of the political action. Consequently,
 even when the military is not being victorious, the political
 action, they state, is listed in the following order of importance:

- (a) Progress towards the military action
- (b) Military action
- (c) Political action in the military domain
- (d) Political action in the military domain
- (e) Political action in the military domain
- (f) Political action in the military domain
- (g) Political action in the military domain
- (h) Political action in the military domain
- (i) Political action in the military domain
- (j) Political action in the military domain
- (k) Political action in the military domain
- (l) Political action in the military domain
- (m) Political action in the military domain
- (n) Political action in the military domain
- (o) Political action in the military domain
- (p) Political action in the military domain
- (q) Political action in the military domain
- (r) Political action in the military domain
- (s) Political action in the military domain
- (t) Political action in the military domain
- (u) Political action in the military domain
- (v) Political action in the military domain
- (w) Political action in the military domain
- (x) Political action in the military domain
- (y) Political action in the military domain
- (z) Political action in the military domain

that will influence the military action in the same
 way that the military action will influence the political action.

munist propaganda. This is not entirely true. There is a deep seated suspicion in the minds of many non-communist Europeans that the United States plans to let them bear the brunt of the fighting, death, and destruction in a future war. They believe we are attempting to buy protection with dollars. They have lived and died through two recent wars and occupations of their own lands and cities. We have never seen war in our homeland. They are tired and discouraged. Many have voiced the belief that they are now so experienced at being occupied that they have nothing new to learn from the Russians along these lines. Some are in favor of making a deal with the Russians because the outcome is inevitable anyway. This philosophy permeates the thinking of all Belgians to a greater or lesser extent, including even the military. They are willing to fight if armed, but they will fight with one eye on the enemy and one eye on the escape hatch. This attitude accounted for their lack of enthusiasm in welcoming their American comrades in arms and the material aid they offered. An important part of our job then was to convince the Belgians of the sincerity of our motives and the determination of our country to stick with them in body as well as in spirit. In case of an attack, there was no question of our evacuation; we planned to stay and join our efforts with theirs.

[illegible]

The differential in living standards was not conducive to that intimacy or informality between co-workers that is so essential in the accomplishment of mutual tasks. "Emoluments, perquisites and privileges are highly important evidences of status and are often highly valued."² The Chinese word for it is "face." The difference in the pecuniary status of the Americans and Belgians constituted a serious impediment to good relations. This difference was reflected in the clothes we wore, in our offices, in our social life, in our habitations, and in the cars we drove. The Belgians found themselves apologizing for the austerity of their entertainment, the brand of cigarettes they smoked, the modest homes they lived in, and the frigid temperature of their offices. Unfortunately, it was impossible for the American group to lower their own emoluments or to reduce their customary standards of living to bring them in line with their colleagues, but it was extremely important to minimize these differences and to avoid any display of ostentation.

By confining our entertainment to the simple things, such as card parties at home, fishing expeditions to the local canals, inexpensive suppers at country inns, and good conversation over a

² Chester I. Barnard, "Functions of Status Systems in Formal Organizations," Human Relations in Administration, ed. by Robert Dubin (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951) 258.

bottle of wine we received an immediate warm response that extended itself later to matters of business.

Another tendency is to accept without question certain assumed facts or modes of behavior. A businessman from Japan, for example, explained with considerable insight the reaction of people in his country to American salesmanship. Generally, he said, the Americans tried to follow the same techniques of selling in his country as were effective in the United States; the same neatness of dress, pleasant, persuasive manner, desire to close the sale promptly, and so forth. In his country the importance attached to little courtesies as contrasted with personal dress and other aspects of social relationships were different.³

Much time is lost in Belgium in shaking hands. It is customary to shake hands with each person at a large meeting, no matter how well you know him, both upon arrival and departure from the meeting. Americans may feel this to be a waste of time, but woe to the individual who ignores the custom. When an appointment is made for two o'clock, it may take place at three, four, or five, or perhaps not at all. It is best to accept this habit philosophically because that is the way it has been done from time immemorial and the way it will be for some time to come. Many Americans took this custom to be a display of silent contempt or downright bad

³ William H. Newman, Administrative Action, The Techniques of Organization and Management, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951) 109.

manners. Americans, generally speaking, have a deep sense of kindness, genuine good manners, and humanity underneath a rather rough surface. Europeans, on the other hand, place more importance on the visual display of courtesy, flowery language, and superficial warmth, while suffering inwardly from a lack of these attributes. It was necessary, therefore, for both sides to make certain adjustments to arrive at an acceptable working relationship.

While on the subject of diverse cultures, the matter of languages deserves mention. A language is more than a vehicle for expression, it is a reflection of pride in nationality. A native of France would not speak French if he were not proud of being a Frenchman. One of the first indications of the upsurge in nationalism in Germany prior to both World Wars was the anger shown by Berliners toward anyone who spoke a language other than German in public. The Americans in Brussels irritated many Belgians by their insistence on using the English language at all times. The Belgians understood that the Americans were poor linguists, and that it would be hopeless to attempt to do business in French; yet, this was their country, not the Americans'. It was found that the most feeble attempt by an American to use a French word or phrase occasionally was rewarded by cheers, backslapping, and cries of "tres magnifique!" "tres bon!" "francaise tres formidable!"

The first of these is the fact that the English language is not a homogeneous whole, but a collection of dialects, each of which has its own history and its own literature. The second is the fact that the English language is not a static entity, but a living organism, which is constantly changing and developing. The third is the fact that the English language is not a purely literary language, but a language of everyday life, which is used by all classes of society.

Scott insisted that technocracy was purely American, and he warned ".....No theory of social action or governance now existing or proposed in Europe, could in any way be endemic to that unique set-up of geologic conformation, technique, equipment, and personnel peculiar to North America."⁴

It is baffling to most Americans to find that Europeans are satisfied with doing things the same way their grandfathers did. As one Belgian officer put it, "All the people who were dissatisfied with the way things were done in Europe have long since gone to America, the ones who remain are satisfied." When we have a job to do, especially a hard or unpleasant one, we go about it in a hurry, we face the unpleasant facts, find a solution, and apply it. The Belgians, on the other hand, approach their work with the idea that work is only one small phase of life—if it doesn't get done today, we may be sure it won't run away—it will be waiting for us there tomorrow.

Technically, we found the Belgian Navy more or less pre-historic. They trained their men in pulling boats on the canals, in the rituals of infantry drill, and in tying knots. They had not heard much about radar controlled rapid fire guns, anti-submarine

⁴ Howard Scott, "Introduction to Technocracy," Administration. The Art and Science of Organization and Management, edited by Albert Lepawsky (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1949) 138.

...the

[illegible]

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

warfare, or the latest minesweeping gadgets. They hated having to admit their ignorance and resented the presence of capable, professional Naval officers in their midst. In an effort to bring them up to date, many high powered enlisted specialists were imported from the United States Navy to train their men and officers in the use of new equipment. These specialists had many frustrating, but humorous experiences working with the Belgian Navy. The experience of one of our gunners is illustrative of the sort of thing we were up against.

This gunner was attempting to supervise the installation of a battery of rapid fire, power driven guns on one of the Belgian ships, a job that ordinarily should have taken only a few weeks. After six months of delay, he was taken to task by the Chief of the Naval Assistance Group. The gunner explained the delay as follows. Work each day commenced at about nine o'clock. By the time he had his tools assembled and rounded up his crew, all hands knocked off for morning soup. Work re-commenced at about ten-thirty. At eleven o'clock all hands knocked off to wash up for lunch at eleven-thirty. Two hours for lunch and back to work at one-thirty. Break out the tools and assemble crew. All hands knock off an hour later for afternoon tea. At three-thirty re-commence work, but at four-thirty all hands disappear to clean up for quitting

time at five o'clock. The gunner had become reconciled to the daily routine, but it was the holidays and leave periods that really hurt. These consisted of religious holidays, mandatory leave periods, etc., that took precedence over any other work, even of an emergency nature.

Any technical problem, no matter how trivial, soon assumed monumental proportions. In estimating schedules, making plans, or setting deadlines, the American was wise who multiplied his normal expectancy by a factor of two to three. Yet, to ignore the indigenous customs and habits of work was to court disaster as far as accomplishment of the aid program was concerned. Perhaps the most difficult hurdle taken by the Americans in maintaining good human relations was the shift to low gear required of them in matters of efficiency and technocracy.

Alexis De Tocqueville, a nineteenth century observer of the American scene, said of the American citizen:⁵

He takes pride in the glory of his nation; he boasts of its success, to which he conceives himself to have contributed; and he rejoices in the general prosperity by which he profits. The feeling he entertains towards the State is analogous to that which unites him to his family, and it is by a kind of selfishness that he interests himself in the welfare of his country.

⁵ Alexis De Tocqueville, "Democracy in America," Administration. The Art and Science of Organization and Management, edited by Albert Lepawsky (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949) 350.

If this was a fair evaluation of the American in 1831 when the United States was but a fledgling among nations, what must be the thought of a European observer today? America has fallen heir to world leadership by virtue of her great economic and military power. Willingly or otherwise the rest of the free world has been forced to accept this leadership or succumb to the forces of fear and darkness which press upon it from every side. Whether this leadership is good or not, remains to be seen.

One needs only to travel briefly in England or on the Continent to feel the jealousy and hate engendered in those countries by the prosperity and might of the United States. Economic aid, military aid, and Point Four are not received in a spirit of thanksgiving, but are taken in the manner of the poor relative accepting largess from the wealthy uncle.

In Belgium, the Military Aid Group frequently were driven to exasperation by repeated references to "your great and wealthy country; we are only a poor small country; certainly a little more aid would not be felt by you." On more than one occasion an American officer was impelled to remark that he was a taxpayer, too. It was evident that the Belgians did not look upon the aid program as any sacrifice whatever to the American people.

Accepting our money was one thing, but accepting our leader-

[illegible]

ship was a horse of an entirely different color. The attitude of England is representative of most European countries, including Belgium. They had armies and navies back in the days when we were struggling to settle a country. Therefore, they look upon us today as Johnny-come-latelys in the game of leadership and military proficiency. The sad truth of the matter is, however, that most of these countries have spent so much time under occupation that they are years behind us in every phase of modern warfare.

Human relations frequently became strained to the breaking point in matters which had to do with the adoption of American strategy, tactics, and techniques. For example, American military equipment is frequently designed to fit the tactical employment of forces. The tables of organization and equipment must be so arranged as to provide for proper utilization, repair, and maintenance of the equipment. It became apparent early in the game that the Belgian military formations were not suitable for American equipment. It was suggested, therefore, that their Army, Navy, and Air Force adopt the American organization en toto. Needless to say, this was indeed a bitter pill to be swallowed by a country steeped in its own military traditions for hundreds of years. Nevertheless, once the necessity for change had been made clear through the use of patience and tact, it was accepted in good faith.

this was a house of an entirely different order. The relation of
 England is representative of most European countries, including
 Belgium. They had never yet taken back in the days when it was
 struggling to make a country. Therefore, they had been in fact
 at every-where in the case of leadership and military force.
 Liberty. The real spirit of the nation is, however, that more of
 these countries have been in with the same degree of force
 and have taken as in every case of other nations.
 These nations from Germany have taken to the world
 point in order with it as in the case of England
 Liberty, Justice, and Democracy. For example, France, Belgium
 England is frequently called to the world's attention as
 France. The history of organization and systems and as an
 power as to provide for French relations, repair, and maintenance
 of the system. It became somewhat early in the case that the
 British military relations were not suitable for the time being.
 and. It was somewhat, however, that they were, and the
 force upon the French revolution in 1793. England, 1793,
 this was indeed a bitter pill to be swallowed by a country which
 in its own military position the hands of power. Therefore,
 upon the necessity for change and how they have been the
 position and how, it was accepted in good faith.

All of this is a far cry from the dictatorial methods used behind the Iron Curtain. Our methods have been democratic in the extreme, and we have learned that the best way is the hard way. "If these tasks of human relations seem challenging indeed, they may not by that token put us on the defensive. The totalitarians of right or left have yet to prove that their prohibitions upon the familiar conflicts yield any completely cooperative people."⁶

⁶ Benjamin M. Selekman, Labor Relations and Human Relations. (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1947) 248.

All of this is a far cry from the glorified mission
 that awaited the Iron Guard. The mission was to overthrow
 the system, and we have learned that the way up is the way
 down. All these leaders of human civilization were annihilated in
 1940 and not a single leader out of the survivors. The reason
 for this is that we have not yet found the way to create a new
 world. The world is still the same, and the world is still the same.

Dr. Johnson

CONCLUSION

CONTENTS

Rear Admiral Miles, Chief of the Foreign Missions Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, once said that the promotion of good human relations with our allies is worth more to us than a hundred ship loads of armor and armament, because without good will, material aid will avail us nothing. We learned the truth of these words many times over in dealing with our Belgian friends. Nothing can be more frustrating than becoming enmeshed in customs, traditions, and points of view which have no meaning for us; which contribute nothing to our joint objective. Yet nothing is so rewarding as the accomplishment of one's mission by the use of salesmanship, diplomacy, tact, and the effort to see the other fellow's point of view.

If the American Military Aid Group had attempted to force its way through the morass of old world tradition, resistance to change and governmental red tape, it is doubtful that anything would ever have been accomplished beyond arousing even greater antipathy. It is true that the North Atlantic Treaty, the Mutual Defense Act, and the bilateral treaties taken together did provide a measure of force, yet to have used this weapon would have been fatal to the success of our venture.

By studying our allies and learning about the things that motivated their actions we had a much stronger weapon than the law.

that is, the fact that the people of the United States are not only the most numerous but also the most intelligent and most energetic of any people in the world. It is this fact which is the basis of our confidence in the future of our country.

Good will, mutual respect and understanding, we believe, are the basis of all true friendship. It is only by the cultivation of these qualities that we can hope to achieve a lasting peace and harmony among all peoples. We must remember that the world is a vast and complex organism, and that the well-being of each part is essential to the well-being of the whole. We must therefore strive to understand and appreciate the needs and aspirations of all peoples, and to work for the common good of all.

It is the duty of every citizen to be loyal to his country and to his fellow citizens. Loyalty is the foundation of all true citizenship, and it is only by the cultivation of loyalty that we can hope to achieve a lasting peace and harmony among all peoples. We must remember that the world is a vast and complex organism, and that the well-being of each part is essential to the well-being of the whole. We must therefore strive to understand and appreciate the needs and aspirations of all peoples, and to work for the common good of all.

It is the duty of every citizen to be loyal to his country and to his fellow citizens. Loyalty is the foundation of all true citizenship, and it is only by the cultivation of loyalty that we can hope to achieve a lasting peace and harmony among all peoples. We must remember that the world is a vast and complex organism, and that the well-being of each part is essential to the well-being of the whole. We must therefore strive to understand and appreciate the needs and aspirations of all peoples, and to work for the common good of all.

We found that they were people just like ourselves, they suffered when their pride was hurt, they needed to maintain face, and they were willing to go a long way under the right kind of urging.

The foreign aid programs of the United States are placing an increasingly great number of American citizens in contact with Europeans. These programs will succeed or fail depending not upon their content, but upon the people who administer them. As Malvina Lindsay warns: "More of what is called 'World Orientation' of people is needed, whether they go abroad or stay home. For in either case they are sure of having to adapt more and more to people unlike themselves."¹ Whatever success is achieved by the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, in promoting the welfare of the United States through aid to foreign countries, will be accomplished primarily through the practice of good human relations.

¹ Malvina Lindsay, "High Livers Abroad, A Long Range Issue," The Washington Post Newspaper, Wednesday, January 28, 1953.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

BOOKS

Dubin, Robert. Human Relations in Administration. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.

Lepawsky, Albert. Administration. The Art and Science of Organization and Management. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.

Newman, William H. Administrative Action. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.

Parker, Willard E. and Kliemeier, Robert W. Human Relations in Supervision. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1951.

Peterson, Elmore and Flowman, Grosvenor E. Business Organization and Management. Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1949.

Selekman, Benjamin M. Labor Relations and Human Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1947.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

U. S. Congress, Senate. The President's Message of April 12, 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty, transmittal of. The Government Printing Office, 1949.

U. S. Congress, House. Congressional Record, digest of April 17, 1949, 81st Congress July-August 1949. The Government Printing Office, 1949.

U. S. 81st Congress. Public Law 329. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The Government Printing Office, 1949.

U. S. 80th Congress. Public Law 253. The National Security Act of 1947. The Government Printing Office, 1947.

ARTICLES

Alsop, Joseph and Alsop, Stewart. The Washington Post, January 28, 1953.

Lindsay, Malvina. "High Livers Abroad." The Washington Post, January 28, 1953.

20, 1953
Steph. Joseph and Gladys Stewart, The Washington Post

[illegible]